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We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development 
when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The 
analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is 
driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by 
government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the 
opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used 
to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be 
summarized  as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and 
compromises the effectiveness of aid programmers; (2) the incidence of 
corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the 
donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is 
good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is 
bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just 
transitory, fixtures of an economy. 
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One of the most long-standing debates surrounding economic development
concerns the e⁄ectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty. It is a debate
which has reigned for more than 50 years, and which is as vibrant today as
it has been in the past.1 In spite of all that has been written, both acad-
emics and policy makers continue to disagree about the merits of overseas aid
programmes as a means of overcoming the impoverishment of many coun-
tries around the world and alleviating the plight of millions of people. This
lack of consensus is due largely to the con￿ icting results of empirical studies
which have failed to produce su¢ ciently robust evidence that might resolve
the issue one way or the other. The present paper o⁄ers an explanation for
this.2
Proponents of foreign aid, whilst recognising its limitations, contend that
it has done much to promote growth and raise living standards, and that the
outcome for many countries would have been a great deal worse without it
(e.g., Sachs 2005). It is further argued that the reason why aid programmes
may have failed on occasions is not that they lacked potential to improve
economic performance, but rather that they were simply insu¢ cient. This
view is encapsulated in the ￿big push￿approach to economic development -
that is, the proposal to inject low-income countries with substantial amounts
of funds in order to enable them to escape from the poverty trap equilib-
rium into which they seem to have fallen. Critics of this approach claim that
it is seriously misguided as there is no systematic evidence to suggest that
foreign aid has been instrumental in fostering growth and development. On
the contrary, it is argued that three decades of overseas assistance have done
little or nothing to alleviate poverty, but have merely encouraged corruption
and helped to keep bad governments in power (e.g., Easterly 2006a). Our
paper falls somewhere in between these two camps: on the one hand, we
show how a su¢ cient donation of aid can, in principle, rescue an economy
from a state of low development that would otherwise persist; on the other
hand, we also demonstrate how such a policy can be largely ine⁄ective, and
even destructive, if the economy is misgoverned and riddled with corrup-
tion. We establish these, and other, results within the context of a dynamic
general equilibrium model in which corruption and growth are determined
jointly as the endogenous outcomes of individuals￿decisions. A key property
1For a review of the many issues and arguments involved, see McGillivray et al. (2006).
2After the clearly visible achievements of the Marshall Plan in post-war Europe, the US
President, Harry S. Truman, announced his intention to extend its success by increasing
aid to the developing world. There was no evidence at the time that the policy would
succeed outside of Europe, and there is still no conclusive evidence today.
2of the model is the existence of threshold e⁄ects that give rise to multiple
development regimes and multiple (history-dependent) long-run equilibria.
To the best of our knowledge, the paper is the ￿rst to present an analysis
of how foreign aid may succeed or fail in eliminating poverty traps that are
caused by poor quality governance. As argued by Temple (2010) in a recent
thorough review of the literature, such an analysis o⁄ers the potential for
making important new in-roads that go further and deeper than existing ap-
proaches. By way of providing background and motivation for the analysis,
we devote the remainder of our introductory discussion to a broad overview
of the di⁄erent literatures on which we draw.
1.1 Aid, Poverty Traps and Governance
During the 1960s, the so-called ￿gap￿models provided the theoretical ba-
sis for analysing the impact of foreign aid on growth.3 Using these models,
Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) famously calculated the amount of aid that de-
veloping countries would need in order to achieve certain growth targets.
Unfortunately, these calculations turned out to be over-optimistic and to
rest on some questionable assumptions. One of the most popular models at
the time was the Harrod-Domar framework which purported to show how
growth could be constrained by insu¢ cient savings that limited the capabil-
ities of an economy to accumulate capital. Foreign aid was seen as a means
of ￿lling this ￿savings gap￿and accelerating the process of capital accumu-
lation.4 The main problem with this framework, and others like it, was the
treatment of aid as a permanent ￿xture, implying that recipient countries
might well be able to achieve their growth targets, but only because of the
persistent generosity of donors: if aid was stopped, then investment and
growth would simply fall back to their initial levels. This is not the type of
scenario envisaged by ￿big push￿advocates, whose arguments are more suit-
ably illustrated within a di⁄erent, more recent, class of models. These are
the models that one ￿nds in the literature on poverty traps, threshold e⁄ects
and non-linearities. The key message of this literature is that, for one reason
or another, an economy may exhibit multiple (good and bad) long-run equi-
3These models are no longer popular in the academic literature, but they are still used
by policy makers. For further discussion of them, see Deverajan et al. (2002) and Easterly
(1999).
4In addition to insu¢ cient savings, other types of ￿gap￿have been identi￿ed as char-
acterising developing countries. For example, Chenery and Strout (1966) argue that low
levels of exports limit the amount of foreign exchange that can be used to import capital
goods, whilst Bacha (1990) and Taylor (1990) emphasise the limited capacity of govern-
ments to collect su¢ cient tax revenues for ￿nancing public investment.
3libria that are history-dependent in the sense that whichever one transpires
is governed by where the economy starts o⁄.5 This means that countries with
essentially the same structural characteristics, but di⁄erent initial conditions,
may face very di⁄erent prospects as regards their economic development. In
particular, these prospects may be very bleak for countries that are poor to
begin with as they may never gain su¢ cient momentum to escape the lure of
a bad equilibrium. Herein lies the basic justi￿cation for giving such countries
a ￿big push￿in order to enable them to break free from this equilibrium.
Proponents of the ￿big push￿approach point to three main reasons for
why less developed countries may become caught in a poverty trap (e.g.,
Sachs et al. 2004). First, contrary to the predictions of neo-classical theory,
low levels of capital in poor countries may be associated with low marginal
productivities of capital, implying weak incentives to invest. This may be
due to several factors, such as low states of human development (re￿ ected in
both the education and health status of the labour force) and poor quality
infrastructure (including roads, electricity and communications). Only when
capital reaches some threshold level might its productivity be high enough
to stimulate investment. Second, impoverished households living close to
subsistence may have little inclination to save, given that they are already
struggling to satisfy basic needs. Again, only above some threshold stage
of development might households earn su¢ cient income to be willing to un-
dertake savings. Third, fertility rates in poor countries tend to be high as
children often contribute to the family from an early age and as parents of-
ten rely on their o⁄spring to provide old-age support during later years in
life. These motives for child-bearing are strengthened by the relatively high
infant mortality rates amongst poor populations, and it may once again be
the case that some critical point of development must be reached before mor-
tality rates are low enough and the opportunity cost of child-rearing is high
enough so as to induce a noticeable reduction in family size and a greater
participation in market activity.
In spite of the above, the notion of poverty traps as real-world phenom-
ena remains a contentious empirical issue. According to some authors, the
existence of such phenomena is unequivocal and the long-run distribution of
world income is distinctly bimodal, being characterised by polarised cluster-
ings of rich and poor countries (e.g., Bloom et al. 2003; Quah 1993a, 1993b,
1996, 1997). According to other authors, there is very little evidence of
poverty traps (at least those caused by low levels of savings or productivity)
and the limiting world income distribution is more-or-less unimodal (e.g.,
5An extensive discussion of the literature can be found in Azariadis and Stachurski
(2005).
4Azariadis and Stachurski 2004; Easterly 2006b; Kremer et al. 2001).6 This
con￿ ict in results has been seen, in part, as an indication that conventional
regression methods are not well-suited to analysing the issue. A di⁄erent
approach has involved the use of calibration exercises to evaluate the quan-
titative predictions of theoretical models that seek to explain poverty trap
equilibria. As yet, however, these exercises have failed to resolve matters,
there being some analyses which suggest that poverty traps are pervasive
(e.g., Graham and Temple 2006) and others which indicate the opposite
(e.g., Caucutt and Kumar 2008; Kraay and Radatz 2007).7
To some observers, the lack of robust evidence on the existence of poverty
traps does not mean that these events are absent or rare, but rather re￿ ects a
limitation in conventional views and interpretations. Thus it has been argued
that one needs to move away from traditional notions of poverty traps and
to consider, instead, the deeper and more nuanced idea of ￿institutional￿
poverty traps caused by poor quality governance (e.g., Easterly 2006b). This
idea has been gaining much support over recent years as both academics
and practitioners have become increasingly aware of the importance of in-
stitutions in determining economic performance. Indeed, some development
experts have called for a radical re-appraisal of the way that one thinks about
global poverty and the way that one assesses the merits of poverty alleviation
programmes.8 The role of governance is a key aspect of this and the issue to
which most attention has been directed is that of corruption.9
Broadly speaking, corruption is de￿ned as the abuse of authority by pub-
6Azariadis and Stachusrski (2004) present evidence that bimodality in the world income
distribution is a transitional phenomena, and that convergence between countries is the
outcome in the long-run. Easterly (2006b) ￿nds that divergence between countries may
persist, but that this divergence is related more to institutions than to initial incomes.
7In Graham and Temple (2006), who use a variable-returns-to-scale model, it is esti-
mated that around 25 percent of the countries of the world are locked in a poverty trap.
In Caucutt and Kumar (2008) and Kraay and Radatz (2007), who calibrate models based
on other potential sources of stagnation (such as coordination failures, imperfect capi-
tal markets, insu¢ cient savings and low productivity), the hypothesis of poverty traps is
rejected.
8For example, Birdsall (2007) (writing as President of the Centre for Global Devel-
opment) has urged the foreign aid donating community to re-think its views on African
development, arguing that the nations of this continent are not trapped by their poverty
but by their weak institutions.
9Corruption is one aspect of governance which also relates to matters of transparency,
accountability, political stability, social order, the rule of law and the like. Clearly, these
factors are likely to be interdependent and the same is true of the relationship between
governance and corruption: just as bad governance fosters corruption, so corruption un-
dermines good governance.
5lic o¢ cials to make personal gains.10 There is now a considerable body of
evidence on the relationship between corruption and economic development.
This evidence points to a relationship that is both negative and two-way
causal: that is, corruption leads to low levels of development which, in turn,
cause corruption to ￿ ourish.11 At the theoretical level, Blackburn et al.
(2006), Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007) and Blackburn and Sarmah
(2008) have modelled this two-way causality, showing how it can produce
threshold e⁄ects and multiple (history-dependent) long-run equilibria, in-
cluding a poverty trap equilibrium. The present paper builds on those inves-
tigations to study the e⁄ectiveness of foreign aid in eliminating this type of
equilibrium when the cause of it is bad governance.
1.2 The Empirical Debate on Aid E⁄ectiveness
As indicated earlier, much of the controversy surrounding foreign aid is due
to the con￿ icting empirical evidence on its e⁄ects. This evidence is the result
of a large body of research which has failed to produce a consensus in spite
of re￿nements in econometric techniques and improvements in the quality of
data.
According to Hansen and Tarp (2000), the empirical literature on the
macroeconomic (growth) e⁄ects of foreign aid can be classi￿ed into three
chronological groups.12 The ￿rst generation of studies covers the period be-
tween 1968-1972 and focuses on the e⁄ect of aid on savings. The general
conclusion to be found in these studies is that this e⁄ect is either negative
or insigni￿cant (e.g., Gri¢ n 1970; Gri¢ n and Enos 1970; Weisskopf 1972).
The second generation of work spans the early 1970s to the mid-1990s and
explores in more detail the links between aid, investment and growth. In
one of the ￿rst investigations Papanek (1973) challenged the earlier results
by presenting evidence of a strong positive correlation between growth and
foreign assistance, a ￿nding corroborated in several other analyses that fol-
lowed (e.g., Dowling and Hiemenz 1982; Gupta and Islam 1983). By contrast,
10For broad surveys of the literature on corruption, see Aidt (2003), Bardhan (1997),
Jain (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Tanzi (1998). For a review of the empirical
evidence on corruption, see Lambsdor⁄ (2006).
11On the ￿rst direction of causation, see, for example, Gyimah-Brempong (2002), Keefer
and Knack (1997), Knack and Keefer (1995), Li et al. (2000), Mauro (1995), Mo (2001)
and Sachs and Warner (1997). On the second direction of causation, see, for example, Ades
and Di Tella (1999), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Montinola and Jackman (1999), Paldam
(2002), Rauch and Evans (2000) and Treisman (2000).
12There are many other excellent reviews of the literature, including Clemens et al.
(2004), Hansen and Tarp (2001), McGillivray et al. (2006), Radelet (2006) and Temple
(2010).
6Mosley et al. (1987) detected no such correlation when applying more re-
cent techniques to broader samples of data, and famously coined the term
￿micro-macro paradox￿to describe the apparent contradiction between the
microeconomic evidence in support of aid e⁄ectiveness and the macroeco-
nomic evidence against it. The third generation of research, which continues
to this day, has its origins in the work of Boone (1996) who is often cred-
ited with reinvigorating the aid controversy by exploiting further advances
in econometric methods (in particular, panel data analysis) and further im-
provements in sample coverage. The main ￿nding of that study - one of the
most rigorous at the time - was that aid has no impact on growth. This re-
sult was subsequently challenged by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier
and Dollar (2002) whose research had earlier formed the basis of a World
Bank (1998) report which concluded that aid has a positive e⁄ect on growth,
though only in countries with ￿good￿economic policies. There have been
several attempts to replicate this ￿nding (sometimes successfully and other
times not) and several strong criticisms levelled against it (e.g., Easterly
2004; Roodman 2007).13
Radelet (2006) provides another three-fold classi￿cation of the literature
which summarises the broad di⁄erences in views that have emerged. First,
there is the view that foreign aid has no impact on growth due to a variety
of reasons, such as bad quality governance, limited absorptive capacity and
currency appreciation. Supporting evidence for this is found in the work of
Boone (1996), Gri¢ n and Enos (1970), Mosely et al. (1987) and Rajan and
Subramanian (2008). Second, there is the view that aid has a positive e⁄ect
on growth, though the e⁄ect diminishes as the amount of aid increases. Em-
pirical support in this case is provided by Clemens et al. (2004), Dalgaard
and Tarp (2004), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Lensink and White (2001).
And third, there is the view that aid has a conditional positive e⁄ect on
growth, meaning that the e⁄ect is context-speci￿c and depends on partic-
ular circumstances. The evidence here begins with the in￿ uential study of
Burnside and Dollar (2000) on the importance of ￿good￿policies, followed
by several subsequent contributions that identify various other conditioning
factors, such as export price shocks (e.g., Collier and Dehn 2001), armed con-
￿ ict (e.g., Collier and Hoe› er 2004), climatic shocks and the terms of trade
(e.g., Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001), and tropical location (e.g., Dalgaard
and Tarp 2004).14
13For a detailed account of the issues involved, see McGillivray et al. (2006).
14Each of these studies uses an interaction term between aid and the conditioning vari-
able under scrutiny. According to Roodman (2007), the results obtained need to be treated
with caution as the statistical signi￿cance of this term tends to be rather fragile and not
very robust.
7Of the di⁄erent approaches pursued and the di⁄erent results obtained, the
most pertinent to the analysis in this paper are those relating to the work
on conditionality.15 In their original contribution Burnside and Dollar (2000)
sought to provide an indicator of good economic management by constructing
a policy index using measures of ￿scal policy (the budget surplus), monetary
policy (in￿ ation) and trade policy (the degree of openness). The key ￿nding
of that analysis (i.e., foreign aid is more e⁄ective in countries that score well
on the index) has been particularly in￿ uential amongst donors of aid and
accords with the presumption (shared by most practitioners) that aid works
better in better managed economies. It is not surprising, perhaps, that the
notion of good policies is often linked to the deeper and much broader concept
of good governance.16 In a more recent investigation Burnside and Dollar
(2004) use the World Bank￿ s set of governance indicators to test explicitly
whether the impact of aid on growth depends on the quality of governance in
the recipient country - a test that turns out be positive.17 Dollar and Levine
(2005) obtain a similar result using microeconomic data, presenting evidence
of a strong positive relationship between institutional quality and the success
of aid programmes ￿nanced by the World Bank.
In addition to the above, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that
foreign aid may, itself, a⁄ect the quality of governance in terms of the level
of corruption. Thus several authors ￿nd that an increase in aid produces an
increase in corruption (e.g., Alesina and Weder 2002; Br￿utigam and Knack
2004; Economides et al. 2008; Knack 2001; Rajan and Subramanian 2007),
whilst others observe a relationship which is non-monotonic such that aid
tends to reduce corruption if it is supplied in small quantities but to increase
corruption as the amounts become larger (e.g., Dalgaard and Olsson 2008).18
15Radelet (2006) divides this work into three broad strands - studies that focus on the
characteristics of recipient country, studies that focus on the practices and procedures of
donors, and studies that focus on the types of activity supported by aid. Most empirical
work to date has been directed towards the ￿rst of these.
16According to the World Bank, governance can be de￿ned as ￿...the traditions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This
includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced,
(ii) the capacity of the government to e⁄ectively manage its resources and implement
sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions among them.￿[http://go.worldbank.org/MKOGR258V0]
17The analysis is based on the very ￿rst version of these indicators, as developed by
Kau⁄man et al. (1999). Nowadays, the indicators are in their seventh incarnation and are
widely used across a range of empirical research.
18Svensson (2000) reports a positive relationship between aid and corruption, though
only for su¢ ciently ethno-linguistically fractionalised societies. As an exception to the
majority of ￿ndings, Tavares (2003) reports a negative relationship, though the results of
Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) may o⁄er an explanation for this.
8As mentioned earlier, there has been growing recognition that the plight of
many countries is symptomatic of endemic weaknesses in governance and in-
stitutions. The foregoing observations raise further concerns as they suggest
that such weaknesses may not only create poverty traps in the ￿rst place, but
may also thwart attempts to escape from these traps. Our analysis explains
why this may be so.
1.3 Models of Aid and Corruption
There are relatively few theoretical investigations into the e⁄ects of foreign
aid when the quality of governance is undermined by corruption. Of those
that exist, the most relevant to the present paper are as follows.
Svensson (2000) presents a game-theoretic model of rent-seeking behav-
iour among di⁄erent groups of agents competing over a pool of government
resources. Rent-seeking is costly and all groups would be better o⁄if they ab-
stained from it and cooperated, instead. The problem is that each group has
an incentive to deviate from cooperation which is therefore not sustainable
unless su¢ cient penalties can be imposed. In considering how this might
be achieved, the author identi￿es a critical level of government resources,
below which cooperation is sustained and above which rent-seeking occurs.
Against this background, it is argued that a windfall of foreign aid might
be counter-productive if the level of resources is already close to its critical
value.
Economides et al. (2008) and Hodler (2007) incorporate corruption into
the Barro (1990) model of endogenous growth based on public goods pro-
vision. Corruption is introduced by assuming that agents allocate their
time between productive (growth-promoting) and non-productive (resource-
extracting) activities. In both analyses it is shown how foreign aid has both a
positive e⁄ect on growth (by allowing for greater public expenditures) and a
negative e⁄ect on growth (by encouraging a greater intensity of rent-seeking).
The latter tends to dominate as the volume of aid increases such that the
net result is an inverted U-shape relationship between aid and growth.
The foregoing contributions highlight some important considerations to
take account of when evaluating the merits of foreign aid in the presence of
corruption. We do the same in the present paper, though our treatment of the
issue is distinct in a number of respects. First, our modelling of corruption is
more explicit and more fully-articulated. The common approach taken above
is to assume an anonymous population of agents, all of whom compete with
each other in the extraction of rents from a given pool of resources in some
unspeci￿ed way. In our case perpetrators of corrupt practices are identi￿ed
speci￿cally as public o¢ cials who ply their trade through the embezzlement
9of public funds using costly methods of subterfuge and deception.19 Second,
the channel by which corruption a⁄ects growth in our model is also more
fully-speci￿ed, as well as having empirical support. The mechanism appealed
to in the foregoing analyses implies a direct e⁄ect of corruption on growth
through a diversion of time away from productive towards non-productive
activities. In our case the mechanism operates more indirectly through a
reduction in public goods provision which reduces productive e¢ ciency.20
Third, and most fundamentally, our analysis is particularly concerned with
the role of foreign aid in helping countries escape from poverty traps created
by poor quality governance. As mentioned earlier, no other analysis of which
we are aware (including those above) attends to this issue.
1.4 Outline of the Paper
Our basic objective in this paper is to explore the dynamic general equilib-
rium interactions between economic development, public sector corruption
and international aid. The model that we use for this describes an economy
in which civil servants, or bureaucrats, are delegated the task of administer-
ing public policy on behalf of the government. This task entails the provi-
sion of productive public goods and services using whatever public funds are
available. Corruption may arise because of the opportunity for bureaucrats
to embezzle these funds, the e⁄ect of which is to reduce capital accumula-
tion and growth by reducing public goods provision. At the same time, the
net gains from corruption decrease as capital accumulation takes place, and
there is a critical (threshold) level of capital beyond which corruption dis-
appears. This two-way causality between corruption and development gives
rise to the possibility of multiple (history-dependent) equilibria, including a
19As Svensson (2000) acknowledges, the simpler (short-cut) approach ought to be viewed
as the reduced form of a more sophisticated framework in which corrupt behaviour is
spelled out in greater detail. Our analysis may be seen, in part, as providing such a
framework. At the same time, some of its implications are di⁄erent from those based
on the reduced form approach. For example, two notable features shared by all of the
above models are the following. First, variations in the incidence of corruption re￿ ect
variations in the time spent on such activity by a ￿xed number of rent-seekers. In our case
variations in the level of corruption re￿ ect variations in the number of rent-seekers. Second,
the amount of time spent rent-seeking increases with the amount of government revenue,
which has the counter-factual implication that corruption is higher in richer economies. In
our case the number of rent-seekers declines as an economy prospers, thereby producing
a negative relationship between corruption and development.
20There are a number of empirical studies which provide evidence of how corruption
reduces both the quantity and quality of growth-enhancing public expenditures, such as
spending on infrastructure, health and education (e.g., Gupta et al. 2001; Lewis 2006;
Mauro 1997; Rajkumar et al. 2001; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).
10poverty trap equilibrium.
The model is used to study the e⁄ects of foreign aid and its potential to
help an economy break free from a corruption-induced poverty trap. We show
how, in general, an injection of aid has ambiguous implications for economic
performance: on the one hand, the government is able to ￿nance more public
expenditures which stimulates higher growth; on the other hand, bureaucrats
are able to pocket more illegal income which strengthens their incentives to
be corrupt. These con￿ icting e⁄ects are similar to those identi￿ed in other
models (alluded to above), but there is an extra dimension to our analysis
that makes it particularly distinct: by strengthening the incentives to engage
in corruption, aid increases the threshold level of capital at which the lure of
corruption disappears. This is another potential hurdle that can compromise
the e⁄ectiveness of aid. It is also another source of interaction in the model
as the e⁄ects of aid depend on the incidence of corruption which, in turn, is
in￿ uenced by the in￿ ow of aid.
The basic message of our analysis is that, in terms of fostering develop-
ment and alleviating poverty, foreign aid works well if governance is good,
but may not work so well (and may even be counter-productive) if governance
is bad. In the case of the latter the economy may end up in an arti￿cial aid-
dependent equilibrium that disappears once aid is withdrawn. This is the
sense in which aid can create ￿development illusions￿- that is, the impres-
sion that an economy has reached a good equilibrium when the equilibrium
is unsustainable as soon as aid is removed because there has been no im-
provement in the functioning of institutions. In short aid is not attacking
the root cause of poverty - namely, poor quality governance.21
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
present the general framework for our analysis. In Section 3 we identify the
outcomes that may transpire in the absence of aid. In Section 4 we do the
same for the case in which aid exists. In Section 5 we study in detail the
full implications of aid under various scenarios. In Section 6 we make a few
concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Framework
We consider an economy in which there is a constant population of two-
period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations of dynastic families.
Agents of each generation are divided at birth into two groups of citizens -
21As Rajan and Subramanian (2007) put it, ￿ The sooner countries recognise that aid is
no panacea, the less likely they are to postpone development inde￿nitely.￿
11private individuals (or households), and public servants (or bureaucrats).22
The former work for ￿rms in the production of output, whilst the latter work
for the government in the administration of public policy. Households are
di⁄erentiated according to di⁄erences in their skills which imply di⁄erences
in their occupations and incomes. Bureaucrats are di⁄erentiated according
to di⁄erences in their proclivities towards corruption.23 All agents work only
when young, being retired when old. Public policy consists of a programme of
taxes and expenditures designed to make available public goods and services
which contribute to the productivity of the less-skilled (poorer) members
of the population. Corruption may arise because of the opportunity for
bureaucrats to appropriate public funds for themselves.
2.1 The Private Sector
2.1.1 Firms
Output in the economy is produced in two sectors - a traditional (or sub-
sistence) sector and a modern (or advanced) sector. These sectors are char-
acterised by di⁄erent production technologies that entail the use of di⁄erent
types of production input. Within each sector there is a unit mass of ￿rms
which hire these inputs in perfectly competitive markets.
Output in the traditional sector (sector 1) is produced using low-skilled
labour, the productivity of which is augmented by the provision of various
public goods and services that are targeted towards the poor (e.g., publicly-
provided health-care, education and training). Formally, each ￿rm in this
22We assume that agents are di⁄erentiated at birth according to their abilities and
skills. Households are individuals who lack the skills necessary to become bureaucrats.
Bureaucrats are individuals who possess these skills and who are induced to take up public
o¢ ce by an allocation of talent condition established below. Thus, as in other analyses
(e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2007; Sarte 2000), we abstract
from issues relating to occupational choice. In doing so, we are able to simplify matters
by not having to consider possible changes in the size of the bureaucracy and possible
changes in the level of corruption that may result from this. Of course, we do not mean to
undermine the importance of corruption in determining occupational choice. As indicated
by others, an economy may well su⁄er as a consequence of this, with a misallocation of
talent between productive (entrepreneurial) activities and non-productive (rent-seeking)
activities (e.g., Acemoglu 1995; Murphy et al. 1991).
23Such di⁄erences may re￿ ect di⁄erences in pro￿ciencies at being corrupt or di⁄erences
in moral attitudes towards being corrupt (e.g., Acemoglou and Verdier 2000; Besley and
McLaren 1993; Blackburn et al. 2006). The main purpose of this assumption is to allow
us to determine the wages of bureaucrats in a relatively straightforward way that does not
demand additional assumptions about how public sector pay is determined. In fact, all
we need for this purpose is that there be at least one bureaucrat who is non-corruptible -
all other bureaucrats may well be potential transgressors.
12sector employs l1t units of labour to produce y1t units of output according to
y1t = l1tGt; (1)
where Gt denotes government expenditures on public goods. Low-skilled
labour is hired at the wage w1t. Given this, pro￿t maximisation implies
w1t = Gt.
Output in the modern sector (sector 2) is produced using high-skilled
labour and capital, with positive production externalities arising from learning-
by-doing. Formally, each ￿rm in this sector combines l2t units of labour with








(￿ 2 (0;1)) where Kt denotes aggregate capital (serving as the usual proxy
for the stock of disembodied knowledge).24 We assume that the government
extracts revenue from this sector by imposing a constant proportional output
tax of ￿ 2 (0;1). High-skilled labour is hired at the wage w2t, whilst capital
is rented at the rental rate rt. It follows that pro￿t maximisation in this case










As elucidated below, there is a unit supply of labour to each sector so
that lit = 1 (i = 1;2) in equilibrium. Since kt = Kt in equilibrium as well,
the above optimality conditions may be written as
w1t = Gt = y1t; (3)
w2t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿kt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿y2t; (4)
rt = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) = r: (5)
2.1.2 Households
The population of households is divided into two cohorts that di⁄er in terms
of their endowment of skills. Speci￿cally, there is a unit mass of low-skilled
households (cohort 1) and a unit mass of high-skilled households (cohort 2).
Each of the former supplies one unit of labour to ￿rms in the traditional
production sector, whilst each of the latter supplies one unit of labour to
￿rms in the modern production sector.
24The absence of Gt in (2) is a convenient abstraction that serves to emphasise the
relative importance of public goods provision for di⁄erent members of society. Thus it is
the less wealthy, less-skilled and less educated members who tend to bene￿t the most from
such provision (e.g., Anand and Ravallion 1993; Bidani and Ravallion 1997).
25Naturally, we assume that the wage of high-skilled labour is greater than the wage
of low skilled labour, w2t > w1t. As we shall see later, this is ensured by the parameter
restriction ￿ < 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿.







it;t + v(qit)] + ￿ log(c
h
it;t+1); (6)
(￿ > 0) where ch
it;t denotes consumption when young, ch
it;t+1 denotes con-
sumption when old and qit denotes bequests to o⁄spring. We model altruism
according to the simple ￿ warm-glow￿ , or ￿ joy-of-giving￿ , motive for making
bequests, as re￿ ected in the function v(￿) which is assumed to be strictly
concave and to satisfy the usual Inada conditions. Bequests are chosen by
agents in the ￿rst period of their lives, being invested in the capital market as
a trust fund which is transferred to children at birth.26 Our particular spec-
i￿cation of ￿rst period felicity implies that the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and bequests is independent of the level of consump-
tion. As we shall see, this leads to the convenient result that bequests are
constant across generations.27
Depending on its occupation, a household earns a total wage income of
wit when young. Added to this is its total inheritance, equal to the wealth
bequeathed by its parent plus the interest earned on this: that is, (1+r)qit￿1.
Given these resources, the household consumes, saves and makes bequests to
its own o⁄spring. On reaching old age, the household stops working and uses
its savings to ￿nance its retirement consumption. Denoting savings by sh
it,





it + qit = wit + (1 + r)qit￿1; (7)
c
h
it;t+1 = (1 + r)s
h
it: (8)
Each household solves the problem of choosing ch
it;t, ch
it;t+1, sh
it and qit so as
maximise (6) subject to (7) and (8). It does so, in part, by setting v0(￿) = 1,
implying qit = q for all i and t: thus, as indicated above, the optimal size of
bequest is the same for each household and is ￿xed from one generation to






(wit + Q); (9)
where Q = rq + v(q).
26Our results would not change if we were to assume, instead, that agents choose be-
quests in the second period of their lives. We adopt the present sequence of events merely
to simplify the algebra.
27This property is true for any speci￿cation of ￿rst period utility of the form u[ch
t￿1;t +
v(bt)]. We choose a logarithmic formulation for simplicity and to save on notation. The
precise role of bequests in the model is to serve as a technical device for ensuring the
existence of non-degenerate steady state equilibria. For this reason, we appeal to the
simplest of bequest motives.
142.2 The Public Sector
2.2.1 Government
The primary role of the government is to provide public goods and services
for the purpose of fostering growth and reducing inequality by raising the
productivity of the less-skilled members of the population. Such provision
may cover a wide range of categories, including education, health, social
infrastructure and the environment. To simplify matters, we consolidate
these items into a composite measure of public goods, denoted earlier by Gt.
We consider the responsibility for public goods provision as laying in
the hands of bureaucrats, some of whom may be tempted to exploit their
positions of authority by engaging in corrupt practices. Given this, the
government sets the salaries of bureaucrats in accordance with the follow-
ing considerations. Any bureaucrat (whether corruptible or non-corruptible)
can work for a ￿rm in the modern production sector to receive an income
equal to the wage paid to high-skilled households. Any bureaucrat who is
willing to accept a salary less than this wage must be expecting to receive
compensation through some form of malpractice and is therefore immedi-
ately identi￿ed as being corrupt. As in other analyses (e.g., Acemoglu and
Verdier 1998; Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2007),
we assume that a bureaucrat who is discovered to be corrupt is subject to
the maximum ￿ne of having all of his income con￿scated (i.e., he is dis-
missed without pay). Consequently, no corruptible bureaucrat would ever
reveal himself in the way described above. As such, the government can
minimise its labour costs, whilst ensuring complete bureaucratic participa-
tion, by setting the salaries of all bureaucrats equal to the wage paid by ￿rms
to high-skilled households.28
The government runs a continuously balanced budget, using whatever
public funds it has available to ￿nance its expenditures on public goods. We
denote by Rt the total revenue of the government, out of which w2t is spent
on total labour costs (i.e., the salaries of all bureaucrats): this re￿ ects our
foregoing observations, together with our subsequent description of bureau-
cratic behaviour which implies that there is a unit supply of labour to the
public sector. It follows that the amount of public funds remaining to be
distributed among bureaucrats for the procurement of public goods is
Pt = Rt ￿ w2t (10)
We return to this expression in our subsequent analysis.
28This has the usual interpretation of an allocation of talent condition. The government
cannot force any of the potential bureaucrats to actually take up public o¢ ce, but it
induces all of them to do so by paying what they would earn elsewhere.
152.2.2 Bureaucrats
The population of bureaucrats is a measure of mass 1 which is divided into a
fraction, ￿ 2 (0;1), of corruptible bureaucrats and a remaining fraction, 1￿￿,
of non-corruptible bureaucrats. Each bureaucrat supplies one unit of labour
to the government for the purpose of administering public policy. Speci￿cally,
each bureaucrat is given charge over pt amount of public funds with which
to procure public goods. It is because of this delegation of authority that
corruption might arise as a bureaucrat may be tempted to appropriate these
funds for himself.
Naturally, only a corruptible bureaucrat would ever abuse his powers of
public o¢ ce, whereas a non-corruptible bureaucrat always behave honestly.
If the former does transgress, then he must undertake certain actions in order
to escape detection by the authorities. In general, corrupt individuals may
try to remain anonymous in a number of ways, such as hiding their illegal
income, investing this income di⁄erently from legal income and altering their
patterns of expenditure. Such activities typically entail costs in one form or
another. For the purposes of the present analysis, we consider the following
simple scenario, based on Blackburn and Sarmah (2008). A bureaucrat who
is corrupt can avoid immediate detection by storing his illegal income in
hiding (rather than investing it in capital) and by mimicing the behaviour
of a non-corrupt bureaucrat (rather than risking conspicuous consumption).
The bureaucrat can then evade subsequent arrest by taking ￿ ight with his
wealth and consuming in secrecy elsewhere. The implications of these actions
are captured formally as follows.29
Assume, for simplicity, that bureaucrats are non-altruistic.30. Like be-
fore, let cb
t;t and cb
t;t+1 denote, respectively, consumption when young and
consumption when old by a bureaucrat of generation t. The lifetime utility
of this bureaucrat is given by
29Our description of events can be likened to the case in which corrupt public o¢ cials
prefer to wait until they leave o¢ ce (when they are subject to less scrutiny and cannot
loot any more funds) before enjoying most of their ill-gotten gains that they previously
stashed away somewhere (such as the underground sector and overseas bank accounts). In
our version of this an o¢ cial faces the prospect of avoiding any risk of being caught. As
argued by others (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1993), this risk is likely to be negligible when
the political will, public pressure and institutional framework for combatting corruption
are relatively weak, which is generally the case in developing countries. In any event, we
indicate shortly how our analysis can be reinterpreted or reformulated to accommodate
the case in which corrupt bureaucrats stand a chance of being apprehended.
30This assumption is inconsequential for our results. As indicated earlier, the fact that






t;t) + ￿ log(cb
t;t+1) if non-corrupt,
log(cb
t;t) + ￿￿ log(cb
t;t+1) if corrupt. (11)
The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) is meant to capture the idea that, for reasons given
above, corruption is not entirely costless for an individual, but entails some
disutility.31 For example, a bureaucrat may need to spend e⁄ort on secretly
absconding with his income, may derive less satisfaction from consuming
in hiding than consuming at home, and may feel some moral shame, or
social stigma, from abusing his privileged position. In all of these cases it
is plausible to imagine that the cost incurred is greater the larger is the
scale of the subterfuge, as measured by the total amount of income that the
bureaucrat takes ￿ ight with and consumes elsewhere. In each case, as well,
it is the utility from old-age consumption that is a⁄ected since it is during
old-age when the bureaucrat makes o⁄ with his ill-gotten gains.32
Each bureaucrat earns a salary of w2t when young. For a non-corrupt
bureaucrat, this is the only source of income. For a corrupt bureaucrat,
there is also pt, the amount of public funds that he steals. As indicated above,
these funds must be stored away in hiding and are therefore unavailable for
consumption and (productive) savings. On reaching old-age, a bureaucrat
retires and consumes all of his remaining wealth. Denoting savings by sb
t, the













t + pt if corrupt. (13)
According to our description of events, a bureaucrat who is corrupt can
avoid immediate detection if he not only hides his illegal income, but also
imitates the ￿rst period consumption and savings behaviour of a non-corrupt




31Following footnote 23, one may think of non-corruptible bureaucrats as incurring
prohibitively high levels of disutility from corruption.
32As a precise example, suppose that a corrupt bureaucrat￿ s utility function is log(cb
t;t)+
￿[log(cb
t;t+1)￿￿ log(et+1)], where et+1 denotes e⁄ort spent on avoiding detection. Suppose
also that this e⁄ort is proportional to the amount of income with which the bureaucrat
absconds. Since this income is equal to (old-age) consumption, then et+1 = ￿cb
t;t+1 (￿ 2
(0;1)). It follows that the bureaucrat￿ s utility may be written as in (11), where ￿ =
1 ￿ ￿. One could think of other resource costs (expenditures of income) associated with
concealing corruption (e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2007).
The disutility cost speci￿ed in (11) is su¢ cient for our purposes.
33If a corrupt bureaucrat was free to make optimal decisions, then his behaviour would
be di⁄erent from this. The fact that he has an extra amount of (illegal) income during
old-age means that, compared to a non-corrupt bureaucrat, he would optimally consume
more and save less during middle-age.
17to maximise his utility in (11) subject to his budget constraints in (12) and







The consumption pro￿les of corrupt and non-corrupt bureaucrats are de-
termined by inserting (14) into (12) and (13). The utility of each type of






























2.3 The Incentive to be Corrupt
A bureaucrat who is corruptible will abuse his position of authority if his
utility from doing so is no less than his utility from not doing so. From
(15), we may state this condition as ￿ log
h
￿(1+r)















1+￿ w2t. The bureaucrat decides on his preferred
course of action by trading o⁄ the bene￿t and cost of corrupt behaviour:
the bene￿t is the extra income obtained from his looting of public funds,
whilst the cost is the lower utility from having to consume his income in
hiding. This trade-o⁄ changes with changes in circumstances. In particular,
for any given pt, the bureaucrat is more likely to transgress when wages are
low than when they are high. At low levels of wages, the extra income from
corruption yields additional utility that more than compensates the costs of
concealing this income. But as wages increase, utility increases by less when
the bureaucrat is corrupt than when he is not corrupt because of his costly
subterfuge. This suggests that there is some critical level of wages, below
which corruption will occur and above which corruption will not occur.
Evidently, the fact that wages are endogenous in the model means that
corruption is endogenous as well. By virtue of (4), the driving force is cap-
ital accumulation. In this way, we establish the ￿rst direction of causation
between corruption and development that runs from the latter to the for-
mer.34 We return to this in our subsequent analysis when we the provide the
34As indicated in footnote 29, it is possible to re-work our analysis under the assump-
tion that corrupt bureaucrats face a risk of being caught and punished. To illustrate,
suppose that there is some ￿nite probability of corruption being detected, in which case
a bureaucrat foregoes some or all of his planned consumption (e.g., because his income
is con￿scated, or because he is imprisoned). For comparison with our main analysis, as-
18appropriate expression for pt. In preparation for that, we make use of (4) to
re-write the above incentive condition as
￿









The ￿nal component in our description of the economy is the process by
which development takes place. This process is summarised by the dynamic
path of capital accumulation, obtained from the equilibrium condition that
the total demand for capital by ￿rms is equal to the total supply of capital
by agents. The former is given by kt+1, whilst the latter comprises the
savings and bequests of all households, sh
1t + sh
2t + 2q, plus the savings of all
bureaucrats, sb
t, where the relevant expressions for these are given in (9) and








As we shall see, the way that corruption takes e⁄ect on the economy is
through Gt, the provision of public goods and services. A precise expression
for this is given shortly. For now, we note that the appearance of it in (17)
means that corruption has an impact on capital accumulation and growth. In
this way, we establish the second direction of causation between corruption
and development that runs from the former to the latter.
In the remainder of the paper we determine the aggregate outcomes in
the economy under various scenarios which di⁄er according to the presence
or absence of foreign aid, and the presence or absence of corruption. We
use superscripts on variables to denote each of the possible cases - either
a or na (aid or no aid), and either c or nc (corruption or no corruption).
In situations where corruption exists, its incidence is measured by ￿Pt, the
amount of public funds that are embezzled.
sume that it is only ￿nal period consumption that is foregone (the loss of ￿rst period
consumption can be trivially added). Under such circumstances, the expected utility of a
corrupt bureaucrat is given by (11), with ￿ re-de￿ned as the probability that detection is
avoided. All of the above results remain unchanged and the only di⁄erence is a question
of interpretation. According to the new description of events, the reason why corruption
is less likely to occur at higher levels of development is that bureaucrats are less willing to
risk losing higher wages, rather than less willing to incur higher disutility costs. Of course,
it is true that this risk is not entirely absent from our analysis, but features implicitly as
the factor that motivates bureaucrats to engage in costly subterfuge.
193 The Economy Without Aid
In the analysis that follows we consider our model economy as being isolated
from the rest of the world such that the only source of development ￿nance
is the savings of its own citizens. In other words, we assume that the econ-
omy is completely closed to any form of international transaction or overseas
assistance that might in￿ uence its development prospects. Our interest is
in what outcomes may transpire in this environment when there exists the
possibility of corruption.
We begin by returning to the expression in (10) which determines the
amount of public funds available for public good procurement. Since the
only source of revenue for the government is the tax on ￿rms in the modern
production sector, we have Rna
t = ￿Y2t, where Y2t denotes aggregate output




t = [￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿]kt ￿ ￿kt; (18)
where we assume that ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ > 0.
A bureaucrat who is corruptible will embezzle the public funds allocated
to him, pna
t , if the condition in (16) is satis￿ed. Since pna
t = P na
t , we may
use (18) to express this condition solely in terms of capital. When holding
with equality, the condition is then understood to determine a critical level
of capital, ￿na, below which the bureaucrat will transgress and above which
he will not transgress. That is,
￿
na = (1 + ￿)
￿
[￿(1 + r) + ￿(1 + ￿)]￿




As anticipated earlier, therefore, corruption is more likely to occur at lower
levels of development.
Recall that the fraction of corruptible (non-corruptible) bureaucrats is ￿
(1￿￿). If kt > ￿na, then corruption does not exist and all of the public funds
allocated to bureaucrats ￿nd their way into public goods provision. Under
such circumstances, G
na;nc
t = P na
t . Conversely, if kt ￿ ￿na, then corruption
exists and only a fraction, 1 ￿ ￿, of public funds are spent on public goods
(the remaining fraction, ￿, being pocketed by those engaged in corruption).
In this case G
na;c
t = (1 ￿ ￿)P na
t . From (17) and (18), it follows that capital






















Under an appropriate parameter restriction, each of the transition paths
in (20) and (21) exhibits a stationary point - de￿ned by b kna;nc = T na;nc(b kna;nc)
in the case of the former and b kna;c = T na;c(b kna;c) in the case of the latter - as-
sociated with a unique steady state level of capital.35 Evidently, b kna;c < b kna;nc
which follows from the fact that, for any given kt, T na;c(￿) < T na;nc(￿). Ac-
cordingly, capital accumulation is lower under corruption than under non-
corruption, which is to say that corruption has an adverse e⁄ect on eco-





t ) as a result of the embezzlement of public funds.
The two-way causality between corruption and development that exists
in our model can have important implications for the long-run outcome of
the economy. Speci￿cally, one observes the existence of multiple development
regimes and, with this, the possibility of multiple, history-dependent long-
run equilibria. As we have seen, corruption is present (absent) for any level of
capital, kt, below (above) the critical level, ￿na. Under such circumstances,
the economy is in a low (high) development regime, evolving along the low
(high) transition path T na;c(￿) (T na;nc(￿)). For a given initial capital stock
of k0 < ￿na, the ￿nal outcome of the economy depends crucially on whether
￿na < b kna;c or ￿c > b kna;c. We illustrate this in Figure 1. Suppose that ￿na <
b kna;c. Then the economy evolves along T na;c(￿) until it reaches ￿na, at which
point it jumps to T na;nc(￿) and subsequently converges to b kna;nc. This chain of
events describes a process of transition from the low development regime with
high corruption to the high development regime with low corruption. But
suppose, conversely, that ￿na > b kna;c. Then the economy is locked forever on
T na;c(￿), converging irrevocably to b kna;c. In this case there is no transition
and the economy remains permanently poor and corrupt. To the extent that
b kna;nc could be achieved if k0 > ￿na, the model now presents a situation in
which limiting outcomes depend fundamentally on initial conditions, with
one such outcome being a poverty trap equilibrium.
4 The Economy With Aid
Our primary interest is in the way that foreign aid might alter the course
of a country￿ s development and, with this, its prospects for long-run pros-
perity. To study this, we consider the case in which our model economy is




21injected with additional funds from overseas that are targeted towards public
goods provision. A common approach in other analyses is to assume that
these funds are given as a proportion of the recipient country￿ s income (e.g.,
Economides et al. 2008; Hodler 2007). This assumption can obviously be
questioned, but it is useful for analytical purposes and it also avoids hav-
ing to make other arbitrary judgements about when aid may be reduced or
withdrawn. In addition, it accords with the view that donors should reward
recipients for good economic performance and that what concerns both par-
ties is the intensity, rather than the absolute value, of aid (meaning aid as a
share of national income). For these reasons, we maintain the assumption,
or rather a modi￿ed version of it, by specifying the amount of foreign aid,
denoted Ft, to be a ￿xed proportion of the economy￿ s capital stock: that is,
Ft = ￿kt (￿ > 0).36
As in the previous analysis, we begin by considering the state of public
￿nances. The total amount of resources available to the government com-
prises tax revenues and aid donations: that is, Ra
t = ￿Y2t+Ft. Proceeding as




t = [￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿]kt ￿ (￿ + ￿)kt; (22)
The incentive for a corruptible bureaucrat to be corrupt is still determined
according to (16), but the amount that the bureaucrat is able to embezzle is
now given by pa
t = P a
t in (22). Again, combining these expressions yields a
critical level of capital, ￿a, below which corruption occurs and above which
corruption does not occur. That is,
￿
a = (1 + ￿)
￿
[￿(1 + r) + (￿ + ￿)(1 + ￿)]￿




In the absence of corruption - that is, when kt > ￿a - all public funds
allocated to bureaucrats are used for the procurement of public goods so that
G
a;nc
t = P a
t . In the presence of corruption - that is, when kt ￿ ￿a - a fraction,
v, of these funds goes missing so that G
a;c
t = (1￿￿)P a
t . From (17) and (22),











36Following Economides et al. (2008), we can motivate this speci￿cation in a slightly
di⁄erent way that relates aid to the degree of inequality, or development gap, between
countries. Speci￿cally, suppose that Ft = ￿(kt ￿ kt) (￿ > 0), where kt denotes the
worldwide average stock of capital. Assuming that kt = ￿kt (￿ > 1), we then have
Ft = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)kt, an expression that is identical to ours with ￿(￿ ￿ 1) = ￿











With a similar parameter restriction as before, each of the transition func-
tions in (24) and (25) imply convergence to a ￿xed point outcome - deter-
mined as b ka;nc = T a;nc(b ka;nc) in the case of the former and b ka;c = T a;c(b ka;c) in
the case of the latter - corresponding to a unique steady state level of cap-
ital. Like the situation without aid, b ka;c < b ka;nc since T a;c(￿) < T a;nc(￿) for
any given kt. Thus corruption continues to depress capital accumulation and
growth by reducing the provision of productive public goods and services.
For the opposite reason, aid has a positive e⁄ect on growth. Note, however,
that this e⁄ect is mitigated when corruption exists as some of the donations
are syphoned o⁄ into bureaucrats￿hands.
Evidently, the introduction of foreign aid does not alter the negative,
two-way causal relationship between corruption and development. As such,
the evolution of the economy and its ￿nal destination depend on the same
considerations as those that apply when aid is absent. In particular, there
are multiple development regimes with the possibility of multiple, long-run
equilibria. For any capital stock, kt, below (above) the critical level, ￿a, the
economy is in a low (high) development regime, being located on the low
(high) transition path T a;c(￿) (T a;nc(￿)) and displaying a high (low) incidence
of corruption. Transition between regimes may or may not be feasible de-
pending on whether ￿a < b ka;c or ￿a > b ka;c. In the event of the latter, initial
conditions determine limiting outcomes, one of which is a poverty trap equi-
librium. These implications can be illustrated diagrammatically by a simple
re-labelling of Figure 1.
In preparation for our subsequent analysis, we note that foreign aid has
three main e⁄ects in our model. The ￿rst, and most obvious, is that the
amount of funds potentially available for public goods provision is increased
(P a
t > P na
t ). The second is that a corruptible bureaucrat can embezzle more
of these funds (pa
t > pna
t ) so that the incentive to do so is strengthened
and the aggregate incidence of corruption is higher (￿P a
t > ￿P na
t ). And the
third is that, because of the stronger lure of corruption, the critical level
of capital is raised (￿a > ￿na). These e⁄ects have a number of important
implications, one of which is the following. For any given level of capital,
three possible scenarios exist - namely, kt > ￿a > ￿na, kt < ￿na < ￿a and
￿na < kt < ￿a. Under none of these circumstances is the level of corruption
lower when the economy receives aid than when it does not receive aid: in
the ￿rst instance corruption is absent in both cases; in the second instance
23corruption is present in both, but is higher in the former since ￿P a
t > ￿P na
t ;
and in the third instance corruption is present only in the former.
5 Aid, Corruption and Growth: An Evalua-
tion
The results obtained so far indicate how bureaucratic corruption and inter-
national aid may impact on the economy and may also interact with each
other. The interaction arises because the incidence of corruption depends on
whether or not aid is received, and the e⁄ects of aid depend on whether or not
corruption exists. We have also seen a similar mutual dependence between
corruption and development, each one both in￿ uencing and being in￿ uenced
by the other. These features imply that an analysis of the consequences of
foreign aid can be quite complicated. In what follows we seek to identify
these consequences, establishing conditions under which aid is most likely to
either foster or impede economic performance.
The donation of foreign aid has two main implications for how the econ-
omy might develop. First, by allowing a greater provision of public goods,
it causes the transition function to become steeper, irrespective of whether
or not corruption exists (i.e., T na;nc(￿) > T a;nc(￿) and T a;c(￿) > T na;c(￿)): this
is conducive to development. Second, by strengthening the incentives of bu-
reaucrats to engage in corrupt practices, it causes the critical level of capital
to increase (i.e., ￿a > ￿na): this is not conducive to development. These
competing in￿ uences give rise to a number of possible outcomes that may be
visualised using Figures 2, 3 and 4. For illustrative purposes, we suppose that
￿na < b kna;c (implying that transition between development regimes is feasible
when the economy is initially without aid) and that b ka;c < b kna;nc (meaning
that the long-run equilibrium of an aided, but corrupt, economy is worse than
the long-run equilibrium of a non-aided, but non-corrupt, economy).37 As-
suming otherwise may produce one or two other possible outcomes to which
we refer later. We denote by kA the level of capital, or stage of development,
at which aid is ￿rst received. From our earlier observations, there are three
possible scenarios - ￿na < ￿a < kA, ￿na < kA < ￿a and kA < ￿na < ￿a. We
consider each in turn.
For the case in which ￿na < ￿a < kA (Figure 2), corruption is not really
37The latter of these assumptions amounts to the parameter restriction (1￿￿)(￿+￿) < ￿,
which implies that the slope of Ta;c(￿) is less than the slope of Tna;nc(￿). This is the case
when the pilfering of public funds mitigates the in￿ ux of aid to an extent that public goods
provision is lower than it would be in the absence of corruption and aid.
24an issue since the incentive for bureaucrats to engage in corrupt behaviour
vanishes before any aid is received and remains that way afterwards. Under
such circumstances, the sole e⁄ect of aid is to raise capital accumulation.
Evolving initially along the transition path T na;c(￿), the economy jumps to
the higher path T na;nc(￿) at ￿na and then makes a ￿nal jump to T a;nc(￿) on
receiving aid. Thereafter, it converges to the steady state equilibrium at b ka;nc.
This result shows that, in the absence of corruption, aid is unambiguously
good for development.
For the case in which ￿na < kA < ￿a (Figure 3), corruption is not an issue
before aid is received but becomes an issue subsequently as the incentives of
bureaucrats change. This has e⁄ects which con￿ ict with those arising from
greater public goods provision. As above, the economy is initially located on
T na;c(￿) before jumping to T na;nc(￿) at ￿na, the point at which corruption dis-
appears. But this is short-lived as the injection of aid lures bureaucrats back
into corrupt behaviour, causing the economy to descend onto T a;c(￿). The ￿-
nal destination depends on whether ￿a < b ka;c or ￿a > b ka;c: if the former, then
there is a further stage of transition as the incentives of bureaucrats change
again such that the economy jumps back up to T a;nc(￿) at ￿a and converges
to b ka;nc; if the latter, then the economy remains on T a;c(￿) and becomes sad-
dled forever with a corrupt bureaucracy at the poverty trap equilibrium b ka;c.
These results demonstrate that, in the presence of corruption, aid can be
costly, perhaps very costly, for development. At best, any gains that accrue
are realised only in the long-run after losses have been incurred. At worst,
there are only losses as the poverty trap would not occur in the absence of
aid.
Finally, for the case in which kA < ￿na < ￿a (Figure 4), corruption is an
issue both before and after aid is received as bureaucrats have the incentive
to engage in corrupt behaviour at both times. As above, the e⁄ect of this
competes with the greater provision of public goods. Starting on T na;c(￿)
again, the economy jumps up to T a;c(￿) at the point that aid is received with
subsequent events being dependent on whether ￿a < b ka;c or ￿a > b ka;c in the
manner described above: if the former, then there is a further jump at ￿a
as corruption disappears and the economy proceeds along T a;nc(￿) towards
b ka;nc; if the latter, then the economy remains on T a;c(￿) and converges to
b ka;c, being mired permanently with corruption and poverty. These results,
like those previously, show that, in the presence of corruption, aid can have
ambiguous implications for long-term development.
A scenario not captured in the above discussion is the case in which
￿na > b kna;c (so that transition between development regimes is never possible
when the economy is without aid). If ￿a > b ka;c as well, then transition is
25also not possible when aid is received and the limiting outcome is the poverty
trap equilibrium at b ka;c. Aid does little to foster development in this instance.
Conversely, if ￿a < b ka;c, then transition is made feasible with the injection of
aid and the ￿nal destination is b ka;nc. This is really the only instance where
aid produces such a radical turn of events that the quality of governance and
development of the economy are so dramatically improved.
The foregoing analysis leads us to conclude that governance and cor-
ruption can be vital factors in determining the merits of international aid
programmes. Good quality governance provides assurance that the potential
of these programmes to improve economic performance is fully realised. Bad
quality governance implies that this potential may be seriously compromised,
if not completely undermined. Since the quality of governance is, itself, re-
lated to economic performance, then we can also understand how the e⁄ects
of aid are liable to depend on an economy￿ s stage of development: the poorer,
less developed is an economy, the more ambiguous are these e⁄ects with the
possibility that aid could do more harm than good. Finally, the prediction
that corruption may rise (at least initially) with aid would certainly ￿nd
sympathy in some quarters. It is one of the main arguments put forward by
critics and sceptics of international aid programmes.
6 Conclusions
Much ink has been used in disputing the merits of international development
aid programmes. To some observers, there is little doubt that such pro-
grammes have done much to alleviate the plight of many countries around
the world. To others, there is little evidence to show that the billions of
dollars spent on these programmes over many years has made any signi￿cant
in-roads to alleviating poverty. This lack of consensus has been a persistent
￿xture in debates amongst both academics and practitioners, and there is
nothing to suggest that it is likely to disappear in the near future.
This paper has meant to o⁄er a theoretical contribution to the foreign
aid controversy. Our objective has been to analyse in detail how the injec-
tion of aid might a⁄ect the long-run development of an economy in which
the quality of governance is undermined by corruption. What makes this
particularly non-trivial (and interesting) is the mutual dependence amongst
variables: on the one hand, corruption both impedes development and com-
promises the e⁄ectiveness of aid; on the other hand, both development and
aid in￿ uence the incidence of corruption. These interactions create the pos-
sibility of corruption-induced poverty traps and aid-dependent threshold ef-
fects. Against this background, we sought to identify circumstances under
26which aid may either help or hinder an economy￿ s development prospects.
The basic message is that aid is good for these prospects if governance is
good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for them if governance is bad.
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